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Definitions 
Corruption: an activity that misuses entrusted power for private gain 
by reducing the public value of a public good to compensate that pri-
vate gain.  
 
Introduction 
Researchers and experts view corruption, especially the international 
variety, as a crime of fraud and abuse of public office that generally 
occurs “over there” and not in their own backyards.  However, re-
cent media reports of widespread corruption at the international 
level, both in developing and developed nations, demonstrates that 
international corruption is at the same time both a local and global 
phenomenon.  In fact, corruption on the international level reaches 
all countries and all facets of public life.  It is evident in the highest 
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offices of the capitals around the world, from the Ex-President of 
Brazil, who was recently sentenced to serve 15 years in prison for 
corruption charges, to a current sitting U.S. President and his 
administration under investigation for conspiracy with a foreign 
power, and where several of his cabinet officials are under 
investigation, or have resigned their posts due to ongoing corruption 
investigations.   
 Corruption on the international level undermines not only demo-
cratic institutions but also the institutions built to protect those dem-
ocratic efforts domestically and abroad.  For example, the New York 
Times reported that corruption degraded the capacity of Ukraine 
military to protect its governmental institutions.  At the same time, 
the Wall Street Journal reported that NATO stood up a task force to 
root out corruption that its own military operations created in 
Afghanistan.  Other media reports described how the pervasiveness 
of international corruption extends even to international tennis, soc-
cer, and the Olympics committee.   
 With the large variety of examples of global corruption, re-
searchers and practitioners should focus on identifying and dealing 
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with the major issues presented by having to manage international 
corruption.  These issues include understanding the multiple ways 
the international community defines corruption and the issues this 
creates, understanding the challenges of corruption to transnational 
governance, understanding the impact of international corruption on 
developing and developed nations, and knowing what the latest tools 
are used to deal with international corruption.  Studying these issues 
from these perspectives will provide a comprehensive and up-to-date 
overview of main issues in managing international corruption. 
Issues with Defining Corruption 
The definition of corruption most often cited in the research litera-
ture comes from the international organization, Transparency Inter-
national (TI), and describes corruption as the misuse of entrusted 
power for private gain.  The definition is both simplistic and elegant.  
It both distinguishes the context (entrusted power), and indicators 
(private gain), in one statement.  This makes the allure of studying 
corruption all the more appealing as compared to the often ambigu-
ous study of ethics.  However, its simplicity is both an advantage 
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and disadvantage when studying corruption at the international level 
of analysis.   
 Terms used to define corruption internationally include a spec-
trum of definitions like “petty” and “grand” or “low forms” and high 
forms” (van Schoor, 2017, pp. 17–18).   This highlights the main is-
sue in defining international corruption.  To define it at the 
international level of analysis, one has to define what corruption 
means in diverse contexts across various nations and cultures.  TI’s 
simple definition is susceptible to criticism that it emanates from a 
western developed nations’ contextualization of corruption.  Thus, it 
has been disparaged as “monochromatic” and too focused on endog-
enous reasons for corruption in developing nations, such as poverty, 
disease, tribalism, and other ails of underdeveloped nations such as 
bureaucratic pathologies or the breakdown in the rule of law (de Ma-
ria, 2008).   It averts attention away from the exogenous causes of 
corruption stemming from inter-national business centric causes and 
overweighs international business welfare above indigenous human 
rights welfare.   
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 Further, the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), published by 
Transparency International and based on its definition of corruption 
focuses attention on corruption from a political perspective that con-
duces to western business interests and is non-supportive of the 
home country’s anti-corruption efforts.  For example, the World 
Bank and Transparency International both assess China and South 
Korea poorly on the rule of law and control of corruption. However, 
Seoul Metropolitan Government can demonstrate high rates of 
online citizen participation (Holzer and Kim 2007).  And the Guang-
zhou Municipal Government leads the region in government infor-
mation disclosure rules, citizen participation law, and administrative 
regulations.  Even in nations with less developed economies than 
South Korea or China, the common structural networks of law and 
democratic institutions may not exist that help makes the payment 
and delivery of government services as transparent as it does in more 
developed nations.  Thus, what may appear as corruption from a 
western viewpoint, may be a necessary process to governing for na-
tions given their current level of development.  
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 Consideration needs to be given for nations with under-devel-
oped economies that do not have the structures in place to exhibit or 
the capacity to demonstrate the levels of transparency expected in 
more developed nations.  Just as the western bureaucrat who re-
ceives personal compensation legally for delivery of public govern-
ment service is legitimate, so too should the delivery of governmen-
tal services by tribal, or other organizational mechanisms, be viewed 
as legitimate as long as the greater value of the action contributes to 
the public good.  Thus, researchers of international corruption 
should understand that the determination of the level of corruption 
should be based on what value the personal gain detracts from the 
public value of the activity in question, not merely on private gain or 
a lack of transparency alone.    
Challenges to Transnational Governance 
International corruption represents a challenge to transnational gov-
ernance.  One reason is the distinction made in the international defi-
nition of private gain based on compensation for public good deliv-
eries versus the public value gained based on societies payment for 
that private gain to exact the public good. Because the calculation of 
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the personal gain versus public value is not easily derived, perpetra-
tors of corruption at the international level can circumvent easy 
identification and disrupt preventative efforts across international 
borders.  At the same time, private to public transactions executed in 
environments where weak institutions exist do not automatically 
lead to corruption.  Whereas the definition of corruption as provided 
by TI implies strong institutional contexts, this is not always the case 
in all context at the international level where transactions occur 
transnationally.   
 Some achievement of basic governmental assumptions is neces-
sary to operationalize the definition of corruption at an international 
level.  To wit, Matten and Moon (2008) identify three underlying 
assumptions: a functioning political-economic market that allows for 
corporate discretion over responses to economic, social, or political 
factors; functioning governmental and institutions that guarantees, 
define, and administers the market and acts on behalf of the public 
good and interest; and finally, that these governmental institutions 
are not captured by private interest for private gain.  Thus, there is 
an inherent difference between how international business and donor 
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transactions occur across international borders in the transnational 
socio-economic spaces and how the international community de-
scribes its expectations for the transparency of such socio-economic 
transactions. 
 As the number of social, economic, and political transactions oc-
curring across national borders increases, the capacity of any one na-
tion’s government to administer such transactions decreases and the 
ability to ascribe accountability becomes harder.  The authority to 
govern such transactions is more diffuse at the international level, 
precisely because of a lack of common contextual understanding of 
the cost and benefits of such transactions.  Therefore, there exists a 
need to understand the meaningful differences of corruption in dif-
fering contexts and to research how these differences are diffused, 
adopted, and implemented in different international settings.  Re-
searchers should also study how international institutions, national 
and local governments, and relevant stakeholders play in this pro-
cess. Understanding the impact of transnational corruption is 
essential so that the problem can be properly defined.  The transna-
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tional characteristics of international corruption exemplify the chal-
lenges presented when trying to deal with it at the international 
level. 
Corruption’s Impact at the International Level 
Internationally, corruption affects the trade between and the prosper-
ity of countries, the governance capacity of both developed and de-
veloping nations, and the level and quality of international security.  
Corruption has a statistically significant and negative relationship on 
a country’s Gross Domestic Product and significantly impacts the 
corporate liquidity of both international and national firms (Chen, 
2011).   For example, the Christian Science Monitor reports that cor-
ruption takes up one third of Russia’s GDP, approximately $318 US 
dollars.  Additionally, Egypt’s level of international trade could be 
much higher if the international perception of corruption in Egypt 
was more on par with developed nations (Shirazi, 2011, p. 442).  
However, beyond the impacts to the public and private domains, in-
ternational corruption is not the only factor impeding international 
trade.  Nationalistic policies on tariffs, corporate tax rates, and capi-
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tal control, as well as geographic location, labor costs, and transpor-
tation infrastructure are significant factors impacting international 
trade (Shirazi, 2011).  This is not to say that international corruption 
is not relevant, or that the international community should not de-
velop anti-corruption regimes.  It does point out, however, that inter-
national corruption may not be the sole issue impeding international 
trade, and therefore should not be the sole focus.  Especially, since it 
is so reliant on contextual interpretations that are susceptible to cul-
tural biases. Still, the research indicates that reducing international 
corruption will have as much, if not more, of a favorable effect on 
stimulating international trade as trade laws, lower tax rates, and in-
ternational currency control measures (Shirazi, 2011). 
 Beyond economic impacts, international corruption severely 
constrains both the decisions of international donors, and flexibility 
of developing nations to access the resources necessary to build the 
social, economic, and political structures of governance to combat 
corruption.   The perception of corruption by donor states about de-
veloping states often dissuades donor states from investing in eco-
nomic and social programs (Persson Anna, Rothstein Bo, & Teorell 
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Jan 2013). This creates a donor-client dilemma scenario where the 
donor wants evidence of anti-corruption structures to be in place, so 
they can confirm to their constituents that their money will not be ill 
invested, and yet the client state first needs the capital resources that 
donor nations could provide to install the very protections that the 
donor states expect.  This, in turn, causes developing nations to go to 
illicit markets to find the resources to establish anti-corruption gov-
ernance regimes, which delegitimizes the effort of anti-corruption 
efforts of the international community, such as the U.S.’s Millen-
nium Challenge Account (Brazys, 2016).  
 The conflict in Afghanistan provides examples of how this di-
lemma plays out in the international arena.  In that conflict, interna-
tional donors established requirements for broad goals of govern-
ance capacity building and institutional reform at the 2008 Paris 
Conference to resource international stability efforts in that country.  
By focusing on solely on governance and institutional reform, the ef-
forts of the international donors miss the political causes of corrup-
tion the ravaged the war-torn country (Forsberg & Sullivan, 2016). 
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 With the rise of globalization and the interconnectedness of cy-
berspace, international corruption has even more of a direct impact 
on the international system from a security perspective.  For exam-
ple, corruption facilitates international security threats derived from 
interdependent relationships between state government officials and 
transnational crime networks, or the facilitation of terrorist organiza-
tions (Chayes, 2014).  The complete lack of borders and specific in-
ternational security regimes in cyberspace only compounds the prob-
lem.   
 In a domain, such as cyberspace, where there is little to no 
recognition of international borders, the lack of governance capacity 
only strengthens illicit actors and weakens legitimate state authority 
(Hughes & Miklaucic, 2016). Thus, this creates an environment that 
is highly susceptible to all forms of corruption and serves to only in-
crease the risks to international security. Moreover, while media 
coverage of potential cyber-attacks usually focuses on the risks 
posed by foreign governments, terrorist, and internet activists, the 
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most likely source of security risk stems from corrupt public and pri-
vate employees who abuse their place of trust and privileged access 
by selling information for personal gain. 
 Another area where corruption directly affects international se-
curity is within the military institutions that were built to provide the 
very protections against the destabilizing effects of corruption.  In-
terestingly, while there has been much research on corruption in 
other international sectors, there has been relatively little done on the 
military and international security sector (Pyman, 2017).   However, 
the defense and security sectors are particularly vulnerable to cor-
ruption in five areas: political corruption issues, financial corruption 
issues, personnel corruption issues, operational issues, and procure-
ment issues (2017, p. 515).  With regard to corruption reforms 
within the militaries of several countries, some cases of reform have 
proven successful more because of administrative rule changes, that 
adjust career patterns and power structures of high ranking military 
officials, than to changes in the rule of law to criminalize such 
activity (2017, pp. 522–523).  
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Tools to Deal with International Corruption 
Efforts to root out corruption at the international level exist despite 
the lack of a coherent definition or understanding of the transna-
tional and true impact of international corruption. This lack of a co-
herent definition and understanding of international corruption has 
led to some blunt tools such as the CPI, as established by Transpar-
ency International.  However, three main efforts consist of the devel-
opment of compliance-based measures of anti-corruption policies, 
technologic efforts, and the establishment of the international rule 
Law.  Compliance-based measures consist of internal national initia-
tives such as civil-service reforms that protect against political influ-
ence over bureaucratic careers outside of the due processes of civil 
service administration (Nistotskaya & Cingolani, 2016).  While 
compliance-based measures are viewed in the literature as insuffi-
cient (Stevulak & Brown, 2011), they are nonetheless, a starting 
point for the establishment of a baseline of anti-corruption policies 
that transcend both national and international levels.   
 The emergence of several information-based technology tools is 
pushing forward an era of anti-corruption efforts that is predicated 
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on revolutionized methods of corruption detection, prevention, and 
analysis.  This technology includes systems for the accumulation of 
big data and the development of software to detect collusion and 
fraud in transnational activities.  Fields such as public health, trade, 
and taxation are employing big data to root out corruption. While 
previously, corruption could hide within massive amounts of data, 
like a needle in a haystack, new data management techniques devel-
oped to handle big data have reduced the inconspicuous nature of 
corruption hiding in plain sight.  Accountability and oversight are 
being enhanced by new processes and tools of data mining.  These 
processes are being incorporated at the international level into e-
government and e-procurement activities to identify high-risk trans-
actions for fraud and susceptibility to corruption.  Lastly, with the 
ubiquitous availability of mobile devices, the development of mobile 
apps is occurring so that the public and governments can easily 
gather data, analyze it, and assess and detect corruption in electronic 
transactions. A specific example, from media reports is the use of 
QR tags to assess the stage projects are at and provide specific infor-
mation on the cost and timeline until completion.   
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 Lastly, the most widely used tool to circumvent international 
corruption are the regimes of international laws that make up the 
conventions against corruption.  Foremost among them is the United 
Nations Convention against Corruption.   According to the U.N., the 
convention against corruption is the only legally binding universal 
instrument available to counter international corruption.  To do this, 
the convention addresses five areas surrounding corruption: preven-
tive measures, criminalization and law enforcement, international 
cooperation, asset recovery, and technical assistance and information 
exchange.  Signed by 140-member states, the convention is a unique 
tool in the fight against corruption, in that it outlines a policy for as-
set recovery and return to the rightful owners. Despite its expansive 
nature and legally binding articles, this convention also has been 
criticized as too vague in some aspects such as non-mandatory 
criminal prescriptions for domestic laws of signatory nations (Rose, 
2015).   
Conclusion 
The lack of a truly international definition of corruption and an un-
derstanding of challenges due to its transnational nature leads to a 
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North-South and East-West bias in the perception of what consti-
tutes corruption.  For instance, surveys of bribery, often used as an 
indicator of corruption, take into account the bribe taker in develop-
ing countries, but not the briber-giver.  This misses both the causa-
tion and level of impact such corruption incurs.  An endogenous per-
ception of corruption is that it is due to a lack of institutional reforms 
needed by developing countries to enter into legitimate membership 
with developed nations.  However, this perspective completely dis-
counts the impact that exogenous factors of predatory international 
businesses exhibit in intentionally dampening the efforts of 
underdeveloped nations to instill such necessary institutions.  
 Thus, the true impact of international corruption is the sustaina-
bility of the status-quo that circumvents regulation simply because it 
can evade agreed upon definitions.  The current research into this as-
pect of international corruption falls short of providing real empiri-
cal estimates of international corruption.  This article contends that 
researchers and practitioners should define levels of corruption ac-
cording to how much it detracts from the public good to serve pri-
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vate interests, instead of its contribution to or detraction from the in-
ternational level of global productivity. Developing realistic models 
of impact, based on contextual definitions of corruption are 
important to developing international anti-corruption efforts. This 
will lead to a better understanding of corruption’s true impact at the 
international level, and the development of realistic tools that are 
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